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AUCTIONING THE CORPORATE BASTION:
DELAWARE READJUSTS THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE IN REVLON, INC.
v. MACANDREWS & FORBES
HOLDINGS, INC.
N June 1985 the corporate heads of Pantry Pride, Inc. and Revlon, Inc.
privately met to discuss Pantry Pride's friendly acquisition of Revlon.'
The talks broke down, and in August Pantry Pride launched a hostile
tender offer for Revlon's shares with the intention of financing the acquisi-
tion through later sale of the company. 2 Revlon temporarily averted the
threat by resorting to a number of defensive tactics that once again
prompted Delaware courts to decide how far to protect directors' business
decisions made in response to takeover threats.
Revlon's board of directors met on August 19 to evaluate Pantry Pride's
tender offer and decide upon a response. An investment banker advised the
board that Pantry Pride's $45 a share offer was far too low a price for the
company's stock. The banker believed Pantry Pride would finance its acqui-
sition with junk bonds3 followed by a bust-up4 sale of Revlon that could
yield up to $60 to $70 a share. Moreover, an outright sale of Revlon, ac-
cording to the banker, should have brought a price in the mid-$50 range.
The company's special counsel next advised the directors to adopt a two-
fold defensive strategy. First, he urged that Revlon repurchase about one-
sixth of its more than thirty-three million outstanding shares. 5 Second, the
counsel recommended a note purchase rights plan, a poison pill,6 which
1. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. is the controlling stockholder of Pantry Pride
and the court referred to the plaintiff throughout its opinion as Pantry Pride.
2. A hostile tender offer is an unsolicited offer by an acquiring party to buy some or all of
a target corporation's stock. See Sommer, Hostile Tender Offers: Time for a Review of the
Fundamentals, in TENDER OFFERS 251 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985).
3. Junk bonds are typically low-rated bonds or preferred stock sold to finance a takeover.
Buyers are attracted to junk bonds because the bonds have a high yield. See Daitz, Leveraged
Buy-Outs, in ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND RECENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS, 1985, at 155 (M. Katz & R. Loeb eds. 1985).
4. A bust-up sale commonly follows a leveraged buyout or other forms of acquisition
financed by junk bonds. Having financed the purchase of a target company with debt, the
seller then sells certain divisions of the corporation to retire the debt. See Lipton & Brown-
stein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403,
1412 (1985).
5. Revlon accomplished this repurchase with an exchange of notes for stock.
6. Poison pills come in several varieties, but a theme common to all is a distribution to
the target's shareholders of securities specially designed to make acquisition impossible or
unattractive. Most pills grant the holder the option of either selling its common shares at a
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would provide each Revlon shareholder one note purchase right per share.
The note purchase right would allow the holder to trade a common share of
stock for a $65 note if any one stockholder acquired 20% or more of the
company's outstanding shares. The board could revoke the plan by redeem-
ing the rights at ten cents each any time before the triggering acquisition.
The acquiror could not participate in the plan. Revlon's board adopted both
proposals.
On August 23 Pantry Pride initiated a cash tender offer at $47.50 per
share subject to financing and Revlon's redeeming the note purchase rights.
Revlon countered on August 29 with a plan for exchanging up to ten million
of its shares for subordinated notes at $47.50 principal backed by covenants
that limited Revlon's ability to acquire additional debt without approval by
the independent members of the board.7 These notes proved an immediate
success. The shareholders tendered 87% of the outstanding shares in ex-
change for notes, and the company accepted the full ten million shares on a
pro rata basis.
Thus, Revlon seemingly blocked the takeover attempt as Pantry Pride
tried unsuccessfully during September to force redemption of the note
purchase rights. Determined nevertheless, at the end of September Pantry
Pride raised its offer to $50 a share. Other offers by Pantry Pride of $53 and
$56.25 followed in quick succession. Earlier in September, however, Rev-
lon's directors had authorized management to find and negotiate with other
parties interested in acquiring Revlon. On October 3 the Revlon directors
met to consider offers and agreed to a leveraged buyout 8 by Forstmann Little
prescribed premium, the "put" pill, or purchasing common stock at a fixed discount, the "call"
pill. In all cases, the option may be exercised only upon some triggering event, usually the
acquisition of a certain amount of stock by the takeover bidder. See Lipton & Brownstein,
supra note 4, at 1425-26. The pill makes acquisition more uncertain by availing put or call
benefits to shareholders other than the acquiror. Fleischer & Golden, Poison Pill, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 24, 1986, at 28, col. 2. Typically, the special securities take the form of preferred stock or
stock warrants. The preferred stock plans generally have a conversion feature by which the
holder may exchange the preferred shares for acquiror's shares at a 50% discount if the take-
over is successful. Id. at 26, col. 1; see also Chittur, Wall Street Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill"
as a Takeover Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 25, 28 (1985) (discussing first preferred share pill issued
by Lennox, Inc.).
Revlon adopted a stock warranty plan with a put option. The pill gave stockholders the
right to exchange their shares for $65 worth of notes per share. With this type of plan the
board was actually announcing the price at which it would sell the company. See Fleischer &
Golden, supra, at 24, col. 3. See generally Herzel & Katz, Takeovers: Poison Pill Warrants,
Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 15, col. 3; Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-
Tiered Takeovers: The Poison Pill Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964 (1984).
7. The exchange of notes for stock is a method of acquiring one's own stock without
making a self-tender offer for cash., For a definition and discussion of self-tender offers see
infra note 60. The purpose of Revlon's note plan was not only to accumulate shares but also to
encumber the company with severe restrictions on its ability to incur additional debt, sell
assets, or declare dividends. Since Pantry Pride intended to break up the company and sell off
parts, covenants forbidding such sale made takeover by Pantry Pride very unattractive.
Lesser, Directors, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 20, col. 1. Revlon priced the notes to match
Pantry Pride's then current bid of $47.50. The notes traded like bonds in denominations of
$1,000 and were subject to market fluctuations.
8. A leveraged buyout is a purchase financed largely through debt. See Daitz, supra note
3, at 149-50.
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& Co., which offered $56 a share for Revlon. Forstmann also agreed to
assume Revlon's $475 million debt incurred by the notes plan. Revlon
agreed to redeem the note purchase rights and waive the covenants on the
notes either for Forstmann or for anyone making a better offer.
When news of this arrangement reached the public, the market value of
the notes, no longer buoyed by the covenants barring further debt, began to
drop. Angry noteholders threatened legal action. At this point Pantry Pride
raised its bid to $56.25. Four days later the Forstmann group offered $57.25
per share and agreed to support the notes upon Revlon's granting certain
conditions: (1) a lock-up option 9 to purchase two choice Revlon divisions at
$100-$175 million below value; (2) a no-shop provision;' 0 (3) redemption of
the rights and waiver of the notes covenants; and (4) a $25 million cancella-
tion fee to be placed in escrow and released to Forstmann if the agreement
fell through or another acquiror received 19.9% or more of Revlon's com-
mon shares. Revlon's board approved the Forstmann offer, citing as one of
its reasons the protection given to the noteholders.
Pantry Pride, having filed for injunctive relief against the note purchase
rights plan in August, amended its pleading to challenge the lock-up option,
the cancellation fee, and the notes and note purchase rights plans."I Pantry
Pride raised its bid to $58 per share on October 22, one daybefore the court
of chancery granted the injunctive relief, holding that Revlon's directors had
breached their duty of loyalty to the stockholders by approving the Forst-
mann offer out of apprehension over legal action threatened by the angry
noteholders rather than out of concern for the stockholders' benefit.' 2
Within a week the Delaware Supreme Court accepted Revlon's appeal and
heard arguments. On November 1 the high court announced its decision in
favor of Pantry Pride. Held, affirmed: When the sale of Revlon became
9. A lock-up option is an arrangement in which the target company in a takeover battle
gives a third party some inducdment to enter the bidding, usually the option to purchase part
of the target's stock at a premium or to purchase certain coveted divisions of the corporation.
Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1068 (1983) [here-
inafter Note, Lock-Up Options]. The third party is referred to as a white knight. See Com-
ment, Anti-takeover Maneuvers: Developments in Defense Tactics and Target Actions for
Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw. L.J. 617, 629 (1981); see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acqui-
sition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1986) (although not illegal, lock-ups must not pre-
clude bidding); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir.) (court
upheld sale of treasury stock to white knight, which thereby derived a significant advantage in
takeover battle), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Kramer, The Formulated Lock-Up: New
Technique Emerges in Takeover Arena, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 3, 1981, at 19, col. 1; Nathan, Lock-
Ups and Leg- Ups: The Search for Security in the Acquisitions Marketplace, 13 INST. ON SEC.
REG. 1, 4 (1982); Note, "Lock- Up" Enjoined Under Section 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act-
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 699 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 881,
892 (1982).
10. Similar to the lock-up, the no-shop agreement gives the white knight the advantage of
exclusive dealing with the target. See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc.,
501 A.2d 1239, 1251 (Del. Ch. 1985) (chancery views no-shop provision as being cut from
same cloth as lock-up), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
i1. As a deterrent the cancellation fee was no different from certain features of the poison
pill and the notes plan, yet Pantry Pride's haste in seeking a temporary restraining order was
directed more at Revlon's placing the cancellation fee in escrow than at the other defenses.
501 A.2d at 1241.
12. Id. at 1250.
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inevitable, the directors had a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest price for
the stockholders. Revlon's directors breached their fiduciary duty of care by
granting Forstmann a lock-up option and cancellation fee. The directors
breached their duty of loyalty by protecting corporate constituencies other
than shareholders out of concern for their own personal liability. Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
I. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Background
One commentator referred to the development of the business judgment
rule as applied by Delaware courts in corporate control contests as "the best
law game in town."' 3 The business judgment rule is a simple idea, but one
that eludes simple definition. ' 4 The rule protects directors from any liability
for harm resulting from their decisions as long as they meet certain stan-
dards of conduct.' 5 The rule has a long history of controversy. 16 Under
Delaware law the business judgment rule derives from corporate directors'
13. Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom,
41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985).
14. The business judgment rule has been defined as "a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985). Attempts at a precise formulation of the business judgment rule acceptable to all
have generally met with frustration. See Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Direc-
tors'Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1478 (1984). Manning argues
that this frustration is due to the futility of using a prudent man standard to judge the activities
of corporate directors when in fact no agreed standard exists for prudent directing. Id. at
1493; see Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111 n.83
(1979) (discussing various definitions of the business judgment rule); see also Fischel, The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1439 nn.3, 4 (1985) (list-
ing recent formulations of the rule).
15. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(d) (1984) (director not liable for any
action if he performed duties of office in compliance with this section).
16. Important Delaware cases developing director's fudiciary duties and the business
judgment rule prior to 1984 include Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983);
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781-82 (Del. 1981); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969, 975 (Del. 1977); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Lynch
v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd, 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977),
on remand, 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979), rev'd, 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981); Gimbel v. Signal
Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23
Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
Between 1980 and 1984, a series of federal court decisions interpreted the business judgment
rule including Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Gearhart
Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Panter v. Marshall Fields & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982). See Greene & Palmiter, Tightened for Take-
overs, Legal Times, Jan. 20, 1985, at S3, col. 3 (special section) for discussion of the federal
cases cited. For a series of articles devoted to the business judgment rule presented at the
Institute on Dynamics of Corporate Control, see 39 Bus. LAW. 1461-1559 (1984) and 40 Bus.
LAW. 1373-1455 (1985).
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statutory responsibility for making ultimate corporate decisions. 17 This re-
sponsibility brings with it, however, a fiduciary duty to the corporation and
its shareholders. 1 8
The concept of fiduciary duty is twofold. Directors must handle corporate
business with the same degree of care as any other reasonably prudent per-
son under similar circumstances.' 9 For directors choosing defenses against
attempted takeovers, this duty of care usually means seeking adequate infor-
mation by the best means reasonably available before making a decision. 20
Directors also owe a duty of loyalty to the stockholders to make decisions in
good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. 21 Courts are aware
that directors in a control contest are invariably torn between their duty of
loyalty and their sense of self-preservation. 22
The business judgment rule is in fact a presumption by the courts that
directors are in a better position than judges to make business decisions.23
This deference to professional judgment is no different from that accorded
surgeons or other professionals. 24 An operation may appear disastrous in
hindsight, but judges do not infer a doctor's or director's breach of duty
from a bad result. 25 Furthermore, a judge will not attach liability unless the
plaintiff first comes forward with enough evidence to cast doubt upon the
defendant's motive or vigilance.26
B. Aronson v. Lewis
In the late 1970s critics assailed the business judgment rule in Delaware
and elsewhere as creating an impenetrable shield around directors' deci-
sions.27 The controversy dealt with the rights of minority stockholders to
17. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). The court in Pogostin traced the
authority for the business judgment rule to the statute providing that a corporation's directors
have discretion over the affairs of a corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1985).
18. See Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225, 229, aff'd, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). One commentator has charged that the term fiduciary is misleading and
is an analogy at best. Manning, supra note 14, at 1493. The manager of an entrepreneurial
enterprise should not be held to the standard of a trustee who must be a prudent investor. Id.
But cf Comment, Director Liability Under the Business Judgment Rule: Fact or Fiction?, 35
Sw. L.J. 775, 781 n.56 (1981) (citing case law that director is trustee).
19. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); see also W.
KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.03 (3d ed. 1978) (direc-
tors also have duty to conduct business in obedience to corporate charter and rules).
20. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
21. See Arsht, supra note 14, at 115-16 (discussing duty of loyalty and director interest);
see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (directors owe fiduci-
ary duty of care and loyalty to corporation).
22. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
23. See Fischel, supra note 14, at 1443.
24. See Arsht, supra note 14, at 97 (business judgment should give directors same protec-
tion afforded other professionals when sued for malpractice); see also Casey v. Woodruff, 49
N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (court found no conflict between business judgment rule
and concept of negligence).
25. See Arsht, supra note 14, at 97.
26. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Del. 1984); see also Veasey, Business Judg-
ment Rule: The New Incarnation, Legal Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at 25, col. 2 (plaintiff has
burden of coming forward and ultimate persuasion).
27. The attack centered in Delaware after William Cary, former Chairman of the Securi-
1986] NOTES 1121
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
force an accounting of the directors' actions.28 In this context the Delaware
Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis2 9 redefined the business judgment rule.30
In Aronson the issue concerned whether the plaintiff alleged breach of loy-
alty with enough particularity to overcome the rule's presumption in favor
of the directors. 3 1 The court of chancery agreed with the plaintiff that cer-
tain consulting fees and other arrangements with a major stockholder ap-
peared to have no business purpose.32 The lower court found that the
plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to permit the inference that the business
judgment rule did not apply.33
The state supreme court reversed and explained that directors should be
accorded the presumption of having made informed good faith decisions as
an acknowledgement of their managerial prerogatives. 34 Courts may not in-
fer a breach of duty from the consequences of directors' decisions. 35 Allega-
tions, however, that directly attack directors' disinterestedness or carefulness
may serve to rebut the presumption.3 6 If, for example, a plaintiff alleges that
a director has dealt on both sides of a transaction or stands to derive from an
act personal gain not generally available to all stockholders, a court may step
in and require the director to justify the act. 37 The burden of proof then
shifts to the director. A court may likewise intervene if evidence shows that
a board did not decide an issue based upon all important information reason-
ably available to it or that the board acted without sufficient care.38
The Delaware Supreme Court in Pogostin v. Rice 39 applied the Aronson
principles in 1984 to a shareholders' derivative suit instituted to force a cor-
ties and Exchange Commission, argued that Delaware's permissive statutes and case law al-
lowed corporations to profit at the expense of the shareholders. Cary characterized Delaware's
prominent position in corporation law as the result of that state's winning a "race for the
bottom." Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 666 (1974). For a list of references echoing Cary's thesis see Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76
Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 913 n.l (1982). The role of the business judgment rule provided the
centerpiece for the debate. The view at that time, as Delaware applied the rule, was that courts
would not intervene unless they found evidence of "gross and palpable overreaching" by the
directors. This approach effectively placed director misconduct beyond judicial reach. See
Arsht, supra note 14, at 93-94. The goal of these critics was to bring about reforms through
federal chartering of corporations. See generally R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 180 (1976).
28. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A.2d 969, 972 (Del. 1977); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570, 573 (Del.
Ch. 1976), rev'd, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), on remand, 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979), rev'd, 429
A.2d 497 (Del. 1981); see also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (derivative
action balances shareholder interest against managerial power of directors).
29. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
30. Id. at 812.
31. Id. at 808.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 809.
34. Id. at 812.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Arsht, supra note 14, at 127-28 (most prevalent forms of bad faith are
directors' improper attempts to preserve themselves in office).
38. 473 A.2d at 812.
39. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
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poration to accept a hostile tender offer. In Pogostin the court tested plain-
tiffs' allegations of directors' self-interest under the two-part analysis
described in Aronson.4° Finding that the allegations, if taken as true, were
not sufficient to cast doubt on the directors' interests in the decision or on
their diligence in reaching the decision, the high court held that the board
was protected by the business judgment rule.4 ' The court also made the
point that the reasoning followed in Aronson applied in a takeover context.
42
At this juncture the business judgment rule seemed well entrenched. 43 As
hostile takeover techniques became more and more sophisticated, however,
boards improvised unusual and controversial new defensive tactics.44 How
far Delaware courts would go in protecting directors' actions in response to
a takeover attempt remained unclear.4
5
C Smith v. Van Gorkom
In Smith v. Van Gorkom 46 the Delaware Supreme Court held that direc-
tors of Trans Union Corporation did not reach an informed business deci-
sion in approving a cashout merger47 negotiated by the company's chief
executive officer; the directors thereby breached their duty of care to the
stockholders. 48 The decision received almost universal criticism primarily
because the offer represented a 50% premium over market price and because
the Trans Union board seemed eminently qualified to make the decision.
49
Commentators argued that the result hardly seemed to justify a finding of
gross negligence by the court.50 The court chose not to look at the result,
however, but at the way the board considered the proposal.5 1
40. Id. at 624; see Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
41. 480 A.2d at 627.
42. Id.
43. See Arsht, supra note 14, at 93-94.
44. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (corporate
law is not static but must address problems created by exotic takeover and defensive tactics).
45. See Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law be Mobilized
to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 346 (1983).
46. 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
47. In a cashout merger, the shareholders of one of the two merging corporations receive
cash for their shares. See Weiss, Balancing the Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 n.4 (1983).
48. The list of information necessary for an informed decision should include fairness
opinions issued by investment bankers, relevant studies and evaluations disseminated to the
board before board meetings, consultation with key management and in-house counsel, review
of various methods for evaluating stock price and comparative outcomes, detailed reports at
board meetings presented so as to prompt questions from directors, and time for reading and
discussing relevant documents. Manning, supra note 13, at 1.
49. Koch, Business Judgment Now Burdens Directors: Smith v. Van Gorkom, 8 Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 15, col. 3; Herzel, Smith Brings Whips Down on Directors'Backs, Legal
Times, May 13, 1985, at 14; Borden, First Thoughts on Decision in Delaware on Trans Union,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 3; see also Manning, supra note 13, at I (reaction of corpo-
rate bar reported as atrocious).
50. Manning, supra note 13, at 5.
51. 488 A.2d at 874. The court's method of analysis is consistent with that prescribed in
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808. Once a plaintiff has brought forth enough evidence to impugn the
care with which the board made its decision, the defendants have the burden of justifying their
actions. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
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The directors of Trans Union were unaware of the proposed transaction,
by which management would acquire Trans Union in a cashout merger, un-
til the chief executive officer of the company called a special meeting to pres-
ent the proposal. No investment banker was present. No valuation reports
or even the text of the proposed agreement were available for review, nor did
the directors request such information. The board approved the plan after a
two-hour meeting solely on the basis of a twenty-minute oral presentation
and the statements of two other executives. The court found that the board's
inquiry and deliberation were insufficient as a matter of law and that the
board was grossly negligent in approving the action with such inadequate
investigation.5 2
The Van Gorkom decision seems to require directors to master a list of
rules for conducting a board meeting. 53 Boards after Van Gorkom must
create at least the appearance of making a thorough and painstaking inquiry
before passing judgment on a proposed transaction. 54 As the dissent in Van
Gorkom pointed out, however, the overview of the entire process, not the
isolated details, is important. 5" Some have pointed out that directors should
have the flexibility to allocate their time as they see fit. 56 Requiring the same
paper trail and exhaustive inquiry for each decision takes a terrible toll on
directors' time.57
Another view of Van Gorkom argues that the Delaware Supreme Court
chose that case as a vehicle to respond to a growing backlash against what
some perceived as an inordinate amount of discretion allowed directors. 58
Even if the accusations were true, the court took little time in reaffirming the
efficacy of the rule by upholding a board's defensive actions against a noted
greenmailer in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 59
D. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
Less than four months after issuing its decision in Van Gorkom, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court upheld Unocal Corporation's selective self-tender offer
made in response to Mesa Petroleum Company's hostile two-tier, front-end
loaded cash tender offer.60 Unocal's board followed well-approved proce-
52. 488 A.2d at 873.
53. Committee on Corp. Laws, Section of Corp., Banking and Bus. Law, American Bar
Ass'n, Guidelines for Directors. Planning for and Responding to Unsolicited Tender Offers, 41
Bus. LAW. 209, 214 (1985); Manning, supra note 13, at 3.
54. See Manning, supra note 13, at 3.
55. 488 A.2d at 897.
56. See Manning, supra note 14, at 1487-88.
57. Id.
58. See Greene & Palmiter, supra note 16, at SIO, col. 1, The Van Gorkom dissent per-
haps implied that the majority was using the case in such a manner by stating that "[t]he
majority opinion reads like an advocate's closing address to a hostile jury." 488 A.2d at 893.
59. 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985). A greenmailer is one who accumulates stock not for
the purpose of acquiring the target, but to sell the holdings at a premium. See Lipton &
Brownstein, supra note 4, at 1413.
60. 493 A.2d at 958. A two-tier, front-end loaded tender offer is a two-step process
designed to obtain 100% control of a company. In the first step, the acquiror makes an attrac-
tive tender offer for a determined percentage of the outstanding shares large enough to gain
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dures in studying the threat and took its action for a proper corporate pur-
pose. 61 At the time of its tender offer, Mesa had acquired 13% of Unocal's
shares and announced its intention to acquire 37% of the shares for a price
Unocal determined as wholly inadequate. Mesa, being a known greenmailer,
however, presented the potential danger of a stampede effect caused by
shareholders afraid of being left out of the first step of Mesa's acquisition.
62
Unocal's board fashioned a response that in effect offered stockholders
junk bonds at a much higher value than the bonds Mesa offered. The con-
troversy centered around Unocal's decision to exclude Mesa from this self-
tender offer. To include Mesa in the tender would defeat the goal of ade-
quately compensating shareholders at the back-end of Mesa's proposal be-
cause every Mesa share accepted would displace one held by another
stockholder. 63 Also, the target effectively would have financed the ac-
quiror's own inadequate proposal if Mesa were permitted to tender to
Unocal. 64
In approving the directors' decision the court focused on the specific pro-
cedures the board followed and the purpose behind the decision. 65 The
board met on two separate occasions. The first meeting lasted nine and one-
half hours. Legal counsel offered a detailed presentation concerning the
board's obligations under state and federal law, and investment bankers ex-
plained the valuation techniques they used to reach the conclusion that
Mesa's price was inadequate. In addition, the directors received information
about Unocal's ability to undertake a selective self-tender. Also, the eight
outside directors met separately with Unocal's attorneys and financial advi-
sors. The board meeting concluded with a resolution to reject Mesa's offer
as inadequate. In a subsequent two-hour meeting the board approved its
selective self-tender after listening to reports about the proposed issuance of
debt securities, the junk bonds, and the necessity of putting restrictive cove-
nants on the company's activities until the obligations were paid.
The court determined these procedures were sufficient for the board to
ascertain that Mesa's offer was inadequate and represented a threat to the
voting control. Once the acquiror has control, it merges the target with itself. The remaining
stockholders receive low-rated securities worth less than the first step price. The load at the
front end is the attractive tender offer. The acquiror hopes to create a stampede as sharehold-
ers scramble to avoid being squeezed out in the second step. Comment, Corporate Law-
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.: The Selective Self-Tender-Fighting Fire With Fire, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 110 n.11 (1985).
In a selective self-tender, the target buys back its own stock for cash, but excludes the ac-
quiror. Although the Delaware court upheld the selective feature of Unocal's self-tender, the
SEC has proposed rule 14(d)-10 to prohibit selective dealing. Proposed Amendments to
Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-22,198, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,978 (July 9, 1985);
see Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L.
REV. 281, 282 (1985); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101,
113-14 (1979).
61. 493 A.2d at 956.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 951.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 957.
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corporation. 66 The directors met their duty to act in the best interest of the
stockholders by showing good faith and reasonable investigation. The court
also held that Unocal's defensive response, the selective self-tender, was
within the directors' legal competence and was not motivated by a desire to
perpetuate themselves in office. 67
Perhaps the most significant outcome of Unocal was the court's recogni-
tion that the business judgment rule may function differently in a control
contest than in other situations. 68 Although the court affirmed in principle
that the rule could apply equally in all situations, the court observed that
directors invariably have mixed motives in deciding how and if to fight take-
overs. 69 This potential conflict of interest creates an enhanced duty calling
for judicial scrutiny before the court extends protection under the business
judgment rule. Thus, Unocal reversed the burden of coming forward in a
control contest to the extent that directors must first show that they were
justified in believing the takeover attempt presented a danger to the corpo-
rate enterprise. 70 A board meets this burden by showing good faith
investigation. 71
The Unocal court also determined that the reasonableness of the defensive
measure must be weighed against the perceived threat.72 That is, the direc-
tors must balance the threat against the cost of defense.73 The court consid-
ered the impact of the board's decision on constituencies other than
shareholders as an example of concerns directors may take into account in
balancing the response to the threat. 74 The court returned to this factor in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.75
66. Id. at 958-59.
67. Id. at 956.
68. See Greene & Palmiter, supra note 16, at 510 (true significance of Unocal is recogni-
tion that the business judgment rule works differently in takeovers than in other board activity,
and directors must meet more stringent standards in takeovers). For further treatment of this
distinction see infra note 70. But see Lesser, supra note 7, at 19, col. 1 (mistaking dictum for
holding that directors' responsibility is same in takeovers as in other situations).
69. 493 A.2d at 954.
70. The significance of Unocal is twofold. First the directors bear the initial burden of
proving they had reasonable ground for believing a threat to the corporate enterprise existed.
See Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986). The
Unocal court also implied that a board should take an active role in a takeover. 493 A.2d at
955. Scholars have hotly debated this issue. See id. at 954 n.9 for a list of articles addressing
the issue. The chief proponent of directors' taking an active role is Professor Lipton, see Lip-
ton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 113 (1979), while Professors
Fischel and Easterbrook argue that boards should take no action against takeover attempts, see
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981). For a list of other articles by these authors on this
subject see Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law Be Mobilized
to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 339 n.13 (1983).




75. 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); see infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
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E. Moran v. Household International, Inc.
In Unocal the supreme court upheld a controversial defensive factor in the
heat of an actual takeover contest. The same court soon thereafter consid-
ered a corporation's defensive action taken as a preventive mechanism before
a takeover was imminent. In Moran v. Household International, Inc.76
Household International, nervous because of its undervalued stock, devised
a poison pill in the form of a preferred stock rights plan. One of the direc-
tors of the company opposed this plan and sued to have it overturned.
As with Unocal, the Moran court carefully evaluated the steps taken by
the directors to inform themselves before adopting the preferred stock rights
plan.77 The court found that the directors made an informed decision
reached only after extended discussions with attorneys and investment bank-
ers. 78 The court applied the Van Gorkom duty of care standard 79 and up-
held the plan as reasonable in relation to the threat posed in the service
industry by takeovers. 80 The Moran court, concluding that the directors
adopted the plan in good faith and in an informed manner, gave the direc-
tors the benefit of the business judgment rule.81
The Moran court discounted Moran's argument that Household Interna-
tional's plan made it takeover-proof by pointing out that several ways existed
for getting around the poison pill.82 Moran also argued that the plan could
not meet the Unocal requirement of being reasonably related to a threat
since no takeover threat actually existed. The court, however, praised the
virtues of Household International's advanced planning. 83 The court stated
that although some takeover threat to the company must exist for directors
to take advantage of the business judgment rule, preplanning such as House-
hold International's reduces the chance of a hasty decision made under
76. 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985).
77. Id. at 1356.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1349. Van Gorkom required that the court find directors grossly negligent
before impugning their business judgment. 488 F.2d at 873.
80. 500 A.2d at 1356-57. Household is a diversified holding company some of whose
subsidiaries are engaged in financial services and other service-oriented businesses. Since
breakup of the diversified company would be relatively easy and profitable and since House-
hold's stock was undervalued, the directors reasonably feared the company was an attractive
target. Id. at 1349.
81. Id. at 1357.
82. Id. at 1354. The court speculated that to overcome the effects of a poison pill an
acquiror might tender on condition that the target redeem the pill, tender and try to solicit
removal of the board, form a group holding enough shares to force a proxy removal of the
board, or acquire one-half of the outstanding shares causing the target to self-tender for the
stock rights. Id.
83. Id. at 1350. The use of poison pills appeared secure after Moran. Recently, however,
the legal community has begun to doubt that pills will survive further judicial scrutiny. See
Blumenthal, Anti-Takeover Measure of NL Is Struck Down, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1986, at 4, col.
2 (New York federal judge struck down poison pill, casting doubt on Moran holding); Wald-
man, Skadden, Arp's Poison-Pill Stance Raises Conflict-of-Interest Concern, Wall St. J., July 23,
1986, at 21, col. 3 (law firms accustomed to drafting poison pills uncertain as to their constitu-
tionality). The SEC has solicited public comment on use of poison pills in an attempt to





After Moran the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to have laid the foun-
dation for a readjusted business judgment rule. Van Gorkom defined the
gross negligence standard of directors' duty of care. Unocal shifted the bur-
den of coming forward from the plaintiff to the defendant, yet also reaf-
firmed a board's flexibility in countering threats to the corporate enterprise.
Moran approved a poison pill adopted as a preventive defense. The decisions
in Unocal and Moran had apparently dampened the harsh result of Van
Gorkom by the time talks began in June between Revlon and Pantry Pride.
II. REVLON, INC V. MACANDREWS & FORBES HOLDINGs; INC
In Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court considered two issues of first im-
pression in the context of a control contest. First the court defined the cir-
cumstances in which adoption of a lock-up option, a poison pill, and a
cancellation fee are valid and protected by the business judgment rule.85
Second, the court prescribed the extent to which a board may consider the
impact of its decisions on constituencies other than shareholders.
The Revlon court began by reaffirming the special nature of a bidding con-
test. Since mergers and takeovers always threaten a director's continued em-
ployment on a corporate board, a conflict of interest is inevitable between a
director's duty to the stockholders and his or her desire to continue in of-
fice.86 For this reason courts will scrutinize directors' acts more closely in a
control contest, and will place upon the directors the initial burden of prov-
ing that they had reasonable grounds for believing a danger existed to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness.8 7 Directors may satisfy this burden with a
showing of good faith and reasonable investigation.88 Once the directors
have made this showing, they must go one step further and show that they
made a reasonable defensive response with respect to the threat posed.89
As it had done in earlier cases the Revlon court carefully examined the
board's procedures for approving the poison pill, the note purchase rights
plan. 90 The court first found that the conclusion of Revlon's board that Pan-
try Pride's $45 offer was inadequate was reasonable based on information the
board received from outside financial advisors. 9' That the board obtained
additional information from financial advisors as to how Pantry Pride would
finance the takeover constituted, in the court's mind, a sufficient showing of
84. 500 A.2d at 1350.
85. 506 A.2d at 176. For other discussions of the Revlon case see Block & Barton, Boards'
Role in 'Hanson' and 'Revlon,' Nat'! L.J., Apr. 21, 1986, at 19, col. 4; Veasey, Business Judg-
ment Rule, The New Incarnation, Legal Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at 25, col. 1; Fleischer &
Golden, supra note 6, at 17, col. 2; Lesser, supra note 7, at 17, col. 1; Levin, Beware of Poison
Pill After-Effects: the Revlon Case, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 9, 1985, at 33, col. 2.




90. Id. at 180-81.
91. Id.
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good faith and a reasonable investigation of the threat posed. 9 2 The note
purchase rights plan, moreover, protected the corporation in a manner con-
sistent with the directors' fiduciary duty to the stockholders. The court
found that Pantry Pride's raising its bids from the low $42 to an eventual
high of $58, primarily because of the poison pill, proved this point.93
The court reached a similar conclusion about the notes plan. The court
reasoned that when the board adopted the notes plan at the August 29 board
meeting, the plan was reasonable in relation to the threat posed, and the
board implemented the plan only after a good faith investigation. 94 The
board's actions of October 3 and October 12, however, negated any further
usefulness of the rights and notes plans. On those dates the directors re-
solved to redeem the note purchase rights, thus ending the plans' usefulness
as impediments to hostile takeovers. More importantly, the board acknowl-
edged the inevitable sale of the company by authorizing the search for a
white knight. With the decision to negotiate with a white knight the direc-
tors' role changed from that of defenders of a corporation to auctioneers
responsible for obtaining the best price for the company.9 1
In assessing the lock-up and no-shop agreements with Forstmann the
court focused not on the directors' duty of care in making reasonable evalua-
tions, but on their duty of loyalty. Once the company was up for sale, any
motivation other than obtaining the best price for the stockholders conflicted
with the board's duty of loyalty. 96 The court observed that a company could
utilize a lock-up option only to entice an otherwise unwilling white knight to
enter the bidding, thus benefitting the stockholders. 97  When the lock-up
ends the bidding, however, it operates to the stockholders' detriment and is
impermissible. 98
The Revlon court followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc. 99 for their ruling on the lock-up
option. In Hanson the target company's management had a strong self-in-
terest in the lock-up, and the board failed to make sure that negotiations
were conducted only by those directors loyal to the shareholders. °  The
92. Id. at 181.
93. Id. The court reasoned that Pantry Pride raised its bid in response to Revlon's rights
and notes plans.
94. Id. Up to this point, the court's determination was a predictable application of its
analysis in Unocal and Moran.
95. 506 A.2d at 182. The court stated that "[t]he directors' role changed from defenders
of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders
at a sale of the company." Id. The justification of the Unocal and Moran decisions in protect-
ing the corporate enterprise disappears when the company is on the auction block. Any action
by the board inconsistent with obtaining the highest price at a sale lacks the rational business
purpose that underlies the business judgment rule. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. Ch.
1971); see also Greene & Palmiter, supra note 16, at 53 (courts will not disturb directors'
actions if rational business purpose shown).
96. 506 A.2d at 182.
97. Id. at 183.
98. Id.; see Note, Lock-Up Options, supra note 9, at 1081.
99. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
100. The Second Circuit decided Hanson after the Delaware Supreme Court had an-
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Revlon court likewise questioned the directors' motives for preferring Forst-
mann's offer to Pantry Pride's. 101 Because the difference in price between the
two offers was miniscule, the court concluded that the board's only justifica-
tion for granting the lock-up option was to protect the noteholders.102 Reas-
suring the noteholders might relieve the directors of a troublesome source of
personal liability, but would produce no benefit for the stockholders. 103 The
court refused to uphold the lock-up agreement because the directors could
demonstrate neither absence of self-interest nor any significant improvement
in the final bid. 104 The court enjoined the no-shop agreement for virtually
the same reasons. 105
In the second part of its opinion the court considered the circumstances in
which a board may consider the interests of corporate constituencies other
than stockholders in a takeover situation.' 0 6 In defending the lock-up op-
tion the Revlon directors argued that the Unocal decision permitted consid-
eration of nonstockholders and that the lock-up agreement protected the
noteholders who would receive new notes bolstered to the original value of
the old notes.' 0 7 The Revlon court observed that by making protection of
the notes an integral part of the agreement with Forstmann, the directors
were protecting themselves from threatened litigation by angry notehold-
ers. 108 Thus, the conflictof interest, always present in a takeover struggle,
increased, enhancing the burden on the directors to justify their actions in
terms of benefit to the stockholders. 10 9
Although the court conceded that a board may sometimes consider con-
stituencies other than stockholders in a control contest, when the contest
becomes an auction, according to the court, such considerations are inappro-
priate. 10 The court held that before directors may consider other corporate
constituencies in a takeover situation, the board must first demonstrate that
nounced its decision in Revlon, but before it issued its written opinion. In Hanson the Second
Circuit tempered use of the business judgment rule in a control contest under New York law.
Id. at 280-81. The Second Circuit, in effect, enunciated a stricter standard of care than the
gross negligence standard defined in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
The federal court enjoined a lock-up option and other agreements with a white knight similar
to those used in Revlon. 781 F.2d at 283. According to Hanson, particularly when directors'
decisions are likely to affect shareholder welfare, the directors' duty of care requires that deci-
sions be made on the basis of reasonable diligence in gathering and considering material infor-
mation. Id. at 274.
SCM argued that the directors approved the lock-up option to spur the bidding. The court,
however, agreed with the district court's finding that the directors knew or should have known
that the lock-up option would end the bidding. "The directors thus face the difficult task of
justifying a lock-up option that is suspect for foreclosing bidding and for thereby impinging
upon shareholder decisional rights regarding corporate governance." Id. at 281 (citations
omitted).









110. Id. at 183.
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the stockholders derive some rationally related benefit from the decision.'I'
Since the principal benefit of the Forstmann agreement went to the directors
and no rationally related benefit fell to the shareholders, the board's action
failed to withstand the enhanced scrutiny required in a control contest.
III. CONCLUSION
In Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished in a takeover con-
test a board's role in defending the corporate enterprise from its duty to sell
the company at the highest price. The court held that innovative defensive
measures are reasonable and justified if adopted to preserve the corporation.
Once sale of the company becomes inevitable, however, such measures are
justified only insofar as they may produce a better price for the stockholders.
This holding forces directors to make yet another hindsight determina-
tion. Not only must directors predict whether a judge will find that their
response to a hostile takeover was reasonable in relation to the threat, as
required by Unocal, they must now also attempt to determine when they
have passed from defending to selling the corporation. The court did not
define what acts suffice to indicate that a company is on the auction block.
One possible consequence of Revlon is that the decision may have re-
moved the lock-up option from serious consideration in future takeover con-
tests. A lock-up option is an inducement to a third party to buy the
company. Since granting the option amounts to announcing the sale of the
company, a Delaware court will uphold the option only to the extent direc-
tors can show that the lock-up option produced a higher price. Directors
can make this showing only if the acquiror makes a higher counteroffer, but
an acquiror will probably not make such a counteroffer if the lock-up option
is enforceable. Thus, either the third party buys the company or the court
will not uphold the option. Either way, the option appears worthless.
The Revlon court also held that directors may not consider constituencies
other than shareholders in a takeover contest unless some rationally related
benefit accrues to the sharehlders. This holding seems to nullify that part
of the Unocal decision permiting consideration of nonstockholder constitu-
encies. If taken literally, this holding forces directors in a takeover contest
to demonstrate a benefit to shareholders before taking any action affecting
other corporate constituencies even if the action does not adversely affect
shareholders. Whether Delaware courts will follow the Revlon holding that
strictly remains to be seen.
David S. White
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